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THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: ISTHE INVESTING PUBLIC
REALLY ANY BETTER OFF?
EMILY WILLIAMS*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed legislation intended to address the
corporate accounting issues that arose in the corporate scandals of late 2001 and
2002.' The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, designed to "protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to securities law,"2
passed Congress in the wake of the Enron bankruptcy and other corporate
accounting scandals.3 The Act attempts to address a number of the issues related to
publicly traded corporations by creating a new federal oversight agency,4
establishing auditor independence rules,5 creating new laws to address corporate
responsibility,6 enhancing financial disclosure requirements,7 addressing analyst
conflicts of interest,' creating new corporate and criminal fraud laws, 9 and enhancing
penalties for white collar crime.'°
One of the key ways the Sarbanes-Oxley Act attempts to protect investors and
restore confidence is by addressing corporate accounting issues." The Act creates
a new federal agency to oversee accounting firms that perform audits, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 2 The Act also establishes new
rules and procedures for auditors 3 and issuers.' 4 This comment analyzes the
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that attempt to improve corporate accounting
and examines how the Act fits into the already complicated statutory and regulatory
scheme designed to protect and inform the investing public.

* Class of 2004, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-.204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
2. Id. The full title of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is "An Act to protect investors by improving the accuracy
and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes."
3. Bill Carlino, The Waiting Game: Profession Begins Weighing Impact of FraudLegislation; SarbanesOxley Act, ACCT.TODAY, Aug. 19, 2002, at 1.
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 101-109.
5. Id. §§ 201-209.
6. Id. §§ 301-308.
7. Id. §§ 401-409.
8. Id. § 501.
9. Id. §§ 801-807, 1101-1107.
10. Id. §§ 901-906.
11. Mike Allen, Bush Signs CorporateReforms into Law; PresidentSays Era of "False Profits" Is Over,
WASH. POST, July 31, 2002, at A4; PresidentSigns Sweeping CorporateReform Bill into Law, DEL. CORP. LITIG.
REP., Aug. 19, 2002, vol. 17, no. I, at 10; Susan Cornwell, CorporateAmerica Having Tough Time in Capital This
Year; CongressPassesAccounting Crackdown but Leaves Bankruptcy, Terrorism Bills in Limbo, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
21, 2002, pt. 3, at 6.
12. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(a). See infra part W.A.
13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 201-209. See infra part IV.C.
14. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 301-409. See infra part I.E.
The term "issuer" means an issuer (as defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act (15
U.S.C. 78(c))), the securities of which are registered under section 12 of that Act (15 U.S.C.
78(l)), or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) (15 U.S.C. 78(o)(d)), or that files or
has filed a registration statement that has not yet become effective under the Securities Act of
1933 (15 U.S.C. 77(a), et seq.), and that it has not withdrawn.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 2(a)(7).
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This comment argues that, although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a noteworthy
attempt at accounting reform, it is largely a compilation of mild reforms, many of
which previously existed as Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) rules. While
the Act contains a few valuable provisions, the legislation's bark is much greater
than its bite. Furthermore, the legislation leaves to the resource-strapped SEC and
the newly formed PCAOB the duty to enforce and monitor the majority of the
provisions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) 5 was Congress's first attempt to
regulate securities. 6 It was part of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal legislation,
passed in response to the stock market crash of 1929.1" A major goal of the
legislation was to provide full, accurate disclosure to the investing public. 8 The
Securities Act required companies to register any securities with the Securities
Division of the Federal Trade Commission prior to selling or offering the securities
for sale. 9 The Securities Act also created civil liabilities for misstatements or
omissions of material facts by the corporation, the directors, the officers, the
underwriters, and experts such as accountants.20
B. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
In 1934, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). 2'
The Exchange Act created the Securities and Exchange Commission, an
independent federal agency responsible for registering and regulating national
security exchanges.22 The Exchange Act requires issuers of securities to register with
a security exchange in order to trade on the exchange.23 Furthermore, the Exchange
Act authorizes the SEC to require issuers to provide financial information upon
registration" and in annual and quarterly reports.25 The SEC has broad authority to
prescribe the content
of these reports and the accounting methods to be used in
completing them.26

15. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
16.
17.

See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATIONS § I-F (3d ed. 2001).
Id.

18. Id. § I-G-3.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1994) (original version amended by Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933, Pub.
L. 100-181, § 201, 101 Stat. 1252 (1987) (substituting "Securities and Exchange Commission" for "Federal Trade
Commission")).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k).
21. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-(l/) (1994).
22. Id. § 78(d).
23. Id. § 78(l).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 78(m).
26. See id.
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Historically, the SEC has delegated its authority to establish accounting methods
to private regulatory boards.27 The SEC has largely adopted the accounting methods
established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 28 the primary
standard setter for the accounting profession. 29 The standards established by FASB
are referred to as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 3 °
C. The Role ofAccounting and the Independent PublicAuditor
Both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act aim to provide the investing public
with accurate information about securities. 3' Financial accounting is the way that
this information is transmitted to the public. 32 As explained by the SEC, "accurate
and reliable reporting lies at the heart of our disclosure-based system, and is critical
to the integrity of the U.S. securities market., 33 Members of the accounting
profession have been described as "the referees and scorekeepers for American
business."34
Thus, pursuant to the securities laws, the SEC requires issuers of securities to
regularly provide financial statements, many of which must be certified by an
independent auditor. 35 The auditor plays a critical role in insuring financial
information is accurate.36 Auditors have been characterized as "the 'gatekeepers' to

27. See MATTHEW BENDER, ATTORNEY'S HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING& FINANCIAL PLANNING
§ 1.02 (2002).
28. Id.§ 1.02[6].
29. Id.§ 1.02[3].
30. See id.§§ 1.02[l], 1.02[3].
31. Revision of Commission's Auditor Independence Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008, 76,008 (Dec. 5, 2000)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
32. BENDER, supra note 27 § 1.01.
33. SEC, Standards Related toListed Company Audit Committees,2003 SEC LEXIS 38 (Jan. 8, 2003).
34. Albert B. Crenshaw & Brett D. Fromsom, A Conflictfor CPAs' Firms'lndependence Questioned as Ties
toClients Grow,WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1998, at HI.
35. Revision of Commission's Auditor Independence Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,012 n.34:
For example, Items 25 and 26 of Schedule A to the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 77aa(25) and (26),
and Section 17(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78q, expressly require that financial
statements be audited by independent public or certified accountants. Sections 12(b)(I)(J) and
(K) and 13(a)(2) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 781 and 78m, Sections 5(b)(H) and (1),
10(a)(1)(G), and 14 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 ("PUHCA"), 15 U.S.C.
79e(b), 79j, and 79n, Sections 8(b)(5) and 30(e) and (g) of the Investment Company Act of 1940
("ICA"), 15 U.S.C. 80a-8 and 80a-29, and Section 203(c)( 1)(D) of the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 ("Advisers Act"), 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(c)(1), authorize the Commission to require the filing
of financial statements that have been audited by independent accountants. Under this authority,
the Commission has required that certain financial statements be audited by independent
accountants. See, e.g., Article 3 of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. 210.3-01, et seq. In addition,
public companies must have their quarterly reports reviewed by independent accountants. Article
10 of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. 210.10-01(d) and Item 310(b) of Regulation S-B, 17 C.F.R.
228.310(b). The federal securities laws also grant the Commission the authority to define the
term "independent." Section 19(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 77s(a), Section 3(b) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78c(b), Section 20(a) of PUHCA, 15 U.S.C. 79t(a), and Section 38(a)
of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37(a), grant the Commission the authority to define accounting,
technical, and trade terms used in each Act. Section 17 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78q, and
Section 31 of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. 80a-30, grant the Commission authority
to prescribe accounting principles to be used in the preparation of financial statements required.
Id.
36. Id.at 76,008.
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the public securities markets."37 Audits are to be performed in accordance with
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS).38 Although authorized to modify
and supplement auditing principles, the SEC has largely adopted the principles and
standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), an organization consisting mostly of certified public accountants
(CPAs).3 9

D. Changes in the Accounting Profession
Recently, the accounting industry has undergone significant change." The
accounting profession has expanded into a global business.4 ' Moreover, many
accounting firms merged, and consequently the majority of independent audits are
now performed by the five largest accounting firms, the "Big Five. 42
One result of the consolidation of accounting firms and global expansion is the
performance of non-traditional accounting services by accounting firms. 43 Most
major accounting firms now offer a wide variety of non-audit services. 4 These
include not only traditional accounting services such as tax services, but also
internal audits, financial consulting, actuarial services, marketing services, and
certain legal services. 4
For the Big Five, revenue from non-audit services now makes up half of their
total revenue. 46 Thus, non-audit service revenues are important, if not crucial, to the
financial success of accounting firms. This reliance on non-audit services draws into
question the true independence of the auditor. A common fear is that audit clients
use their control over non-audit services to influence the auditing firm's opinion on
their financial statements.48

37. Id. at 76,011.
38.

See BENDER, supra note 27 § 12.01.

39. Id. See generally AICPA, at http://www.aicpa.org (last visited July 21, 2003) (providing text of the
GAAS and Auditors Code of Professional Conduct).
40. Revision of Commission's Auditor Independence Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,013.
41.

Id.

42. Id. See generallyReed Abelson, Two of the Big Six in Accounting Plan to Form New No. 1, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 1997, at Al (noting that the "Big Five" referred to Arthur Anderson, L.L.P.; PricewaterhouseCoopers,
L.LP.; Ernst & Young, L.L.P.; KPMG, Peat Marwick, L.L.P.; and Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P.).
43. Revision of Commission's Auditor Independence Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,013.
44. Id.
45. The remaining "Big Four" offer a wide variety of accounting services on their websites. See generally
KPMG, Peat Marwick, at http://www.kpmg.comlservices/ (last visited July 21, 2003); Deloitte & Touche, at
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/home/0%2C2334%2Csid%25253DI000%2C00.html (last visited July 21, 2003);
PricewaterhouseCoopers, at http://www.pwcglobal.com/us/eng/aboutlsvcs/index.html (last visited July 21, 2003);
Ernst & Young, at http://www.ey.com/global/content.nsf/International/services (last visited July 21, 2003).
46. Revision of Commission's Auditor Independence Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,012.
at 76,010.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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E. Changes in the FinancialMarket Landscape
Changes in the operation of financial markets have also affected
accounting
practices.49 In the current market, the price of a company's
stock is heavily
influenced by the company's ability to meet the growth and earnings
projections of
financial analysts.50 Thus, public companies are under extreme pressure
to maintain
or improve stock prices by meeting earnings estimates." This
pressure leads
companies to make accounting decisions based on the results the decision
will have
on earnings-in effect, to manage their earnings. 2 The net result
can be "creative"
accounting practices that inaccurately represent a company's financial
situation.53
There are a handful of accounting methods that are often used
to manipulate
statements of a company's earnings. The most common area of abuse
involves the
recognition of revenue. 4 In general, revenue should be recognized
in
the
period in
which it is realized and earned. 5 Improper revenue recognition
occurs when a
company recognizes revenue in a period before it is truly earned or
realized, or when
a company falsely recognizes revenue. 6 For example, Enron apparently
manipulated
its earnings by inaccurately recognizing revenue on energy trades.5
When the
company traded electricity or gas, it recorded the entire amount of
the
transaction
as revenue. 58 A more accurate accounting would have recorded the
profit or loss on
the transaction as revenue, treating it like a brokerage fee or commission. 9
Another common area of manipulation involves losses.6" Companies
use loss
contingencies, allowances, and reserves to smooth income from year
to year.6 These
so-called "cookie jar reserves" allow a company to overestimate
or prematurely
record a loss or expense in order to reduce income in an earlier period.
62
WorldCom
used this type of reserve by overestimating expected expenses
and then later
reversing them to improve reported earnings.63
The capitalization of expenses provides another opportunity
to
earnings.' Generally, when a cost incurred is related to a benefit that manipulate
is expected to
be limited to the current accounting period, the entire cost should
be expensed in

49. See id. at 76,013.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Manuel A. Rodriguez, Comment, The Numbers Game: Manipulation
of Financial Reporting by
Corporationsand Their Executives, 10 U. MIAMI BuS. L. REV. 451,
459 (2002).
53. Id.
54. David B. Harms et al., Behind the Numbers: A Review of Six
Accounting Problem Areas, in WHAT
EVERY LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT ACCOUNTING-OR
ELSE 579, 584 (John White, chair, 2002).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Gretchen Morgenson, Enron 's Collapse: News Analysis; A Bubble
No One Wanted to Pop, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2002, at Al.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Harms, supra note 54, at 610.
61. Id.
62. Rodriguez, supra note 52, at 461.

63. David Ward, Reserves Being Misused to Boost Earnings;
Accounting: WorldCom Employedthe "Cookie
Jar" Practice to Help It Hide $3.9 Billion in Expenses, Experts
Say, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2002, pt. 3, at 3.
64. Harms, supra note 54, at 624.
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that period.65 In contrast, a cost that is expected to provide a benefit in future periods
should be capitalized.66 The underlying principle is that the cost should be spread
out over the periods when the benefit occurs.67 Whether a benefit occurs in the
current period, however, is not always clear.68 This ambiguity may be used to
understate expenses, and likewise overstate earnings, by improperly capitalizing
expenses.69 WorldCom was charged with overstating its income in 2001 by $3.8
billion using this technique.7 °
These and many other accounting methods are used by companies to manipulate
earnings. Caught in the middle of these accounting manipulations are the auditors
who are pressured to go along with the companies' estimates and decisions. 71 As
former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt explains, "Companies can't afford to disappoint
Wall Street earnings expectations, so they are tempted to push their earnings, even
to the point of deception. And aggressive or sometimes creative accounting is often
overlooked by auditors preoccupied with the desire to preserve lucrative auditing
and consulting contracts. 7 2
F. Accounting Issues under Scrutiny
The many roles played by accounting firms and the increased pressure on auditors
to rubber stamp creative accounting practices raised serious questions about the
integrity of the financial disclosure and auditing system in the United States.73 In
1996, Representative John Dingell requested a review of the accounting profession
by the General Accounting Office (GAO). 74 The GAO produced a comprehensive
report that addressed five areas related to auditing: (1) auditor independence, (2)
auditor's responsibilities for fraud and internal controls, (3) audit quality, (4) the
accounting and auditing standard-setting process and the effectiveness of financial
reporting, and (5) the role of the auditor in the further enhancement of financial
reporting. 75 The report brought to the forefront questions about the reliability of
audits and the financial reporting system.76
In 1997, in response to pressure from Congress, investors, and many others, the
SEC announced that the AICPA was creating an Independence Standards Board

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.at 648.
70. James S. Granelli et al., The WorldCom Scandal; What Went Wrong? SEC Targets Top Execs; Errors
Shock Analysts, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2002, pt. 3, at I (explaining that ordinary costs for connecting customers to
WorldCom's network were recorded as capitalized expenses on the company's balance sheet rather than expenses
on the profit and loss statement).
71. Id. See also Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008,
76,013 (Dec. 5, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
72. Arthur Levitt, Who Audits the Auditors?, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2002, at A29.
73. See supra note 71.
74. ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE
ACCOUNTING PROFESSION, MAJOR ISSUES: PROGRESS AND CONCERNS 2 (1996).
75. Id. at 4, 22.
76. Id.
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(ISB) to establish independence standards for auditors.77 However, in 2000, in an
unusual move, the SEC bypassed the AICPA and the ISB and proposed a number
of its own rules regarding the independence of auditors.78 The proposed rules
detailed financial, employment, and business relationships that impair auditor
independence.7 9 The proposed rules also banned ten types of non-audit services.8 0
In December 2000, the SEC enacted a watered-down version of these rules.8 '
111. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Enron, WorldCom, and Other CorporateScandals
In the midst of discussions about auditor independence came the Enron scandal.
On December 2, 2001, Enron filed the largest bankruptcy petition in U.S. history.82
Enron allegedly overstated reported profits by almost $600 million83 and managed
to hide more than $1 billion in debt in partnerships." Implicated in the Enron
scandal was the Big Five firm Arthur Anderson, which had conducted Enron's
audits.85 Enron, however, was just the beginning, as other accounting scandals were
exposed in the months after Enron's bankruptcy announcement.
Late in June 2002, WorldCom announced that it had misstated $3.8 billion in its
financial statements.86 The SEC quickly filed civil fraud charges against the
company. 87 Shortly thereafter, the company filed for bankruptcy protection.88 The
company went on to make additional restatements totaling more than $9 billion.8 9
These and other accounting scandals left many doubting the integrity of the
auditing system. 90 In response, Congress drafted legislation to address the apparent
problems in the corporate accounting arena. 9'

77. News Release, SEC and AICPA Announce the Creation of a New Independence Standards Board (May
21, 1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/pressarchive/1997/97-4l .txt.
78. Revision of Commission's Auditor Independence Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,148 (July 12, 2000).
79. Id. at 43,148 & 43,190-92.
80. Id. at 43,148 & 41,192. The proposed rules prohibited ten non-audit services: bookkeeping services,
financial information systems design and implementation, appraisal or valuation services, actuarial services, internal
audit outsourcing, management functions, human resources, broker-dealer, investment advisor or investment
banking services, legal services, and expert services. Id.
81. Revision of Commission's Auditor Independence Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008, 76,043 (Dec. 5, 2000)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240) (revising final rules to prohibit nine non-audit services and adding several
exceptions to the prohibitions).
82. Peter Behr, Ailing Enron Filesfor Chapter II Bankruptcy Protection,WASH. POST, Dec. 3,2001, at A7.
83. Id.
84. Bloomberg News, Enron Shareholders' Move Against Banks Is Rebuffed by Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
28, 2003, at C5.
85. Floyd Norris, Enron 's Many Strands:The Auditors; Memo Says Auditors Sought, but Didn'tGet, Crucial
Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at C7.
86. WorldCom announced the financial misstatements on June 21, 2002. Seth Schiesel & Simon Romero,
WorldCom Strikes a Deal with SEC, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2002, at Cl.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., The Watchdog Doesn't Bark, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2002, at C16.
See Carlino, supra note 3.
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B. Legislation in Response to Enron and Other Scandals
On February 14, 2002, shortly after Enron announced bankruptcy, Representative
Michael Oxley introduced House Bill 3763, titled the Corporate and Auditing
Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002.92 The bill addressed
auditor independence and financial disclosures.93 House Bill 3763 passed the
House,
94
with a few minor amendments, on April 24, 2002, by a vote of 334 to 90.
On June 25, 2002, Senator Paul Sarbanes introduced Senate Bill 2673.9' The bill
contained three separately titled proposals: The Public Company Accounting
Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, the White-Collar Crime Penalty
Enhancement Act of 2002, and the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability
Act of 2002.96 On July 15, 2002, the Senate passed House Bill 3763 with
amendments from Senate Bill 2673. 9' The Senate included the provisions regarding
criminal fraud98 and white-collar crime penalty enhancements. 99 A conference
committee worked out the details of the bill and on July 25, 2002, both chambers
overwhelmingly passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.100 On July 30, 2002,
President Bush signed the legislation, announcing it to be "the most far reaching
reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt."'°!
IV. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act addresses the failings of corporate accounting from three
starting points. First, the Act establishes federal regulation of the accounting
industry by creating the PCAOB. °2 Second, the Act prescribes specific rules and
procedures for accounting firms and auditors. 03 And finally, the Act prescribes new
rules and procedures for issuers."
A. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act establishes the PCAOB.'05 The PCAOB is
responsible for registering public accounting firms that audit publicly traded

92. See Union Calendar No. 247, H.R. 3763, 107th Congress (2d sess.), available at http://www.house.
gov/rules/h3763_rh.pdf (last visited July 21, 2003).
93. Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th
Cong. (2002).
94. Union Calendar No. 247, H.R. 3763, supra note 92.
95. Calendar No. 442, S. 2673, 107th Congress (2d sess.), available at http://www.energymarketers.com/
documents/S2673.pdf (last visited July 21, 2003).
96. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, S. 2763, 107th Cong. (2002).
97. Calendar No. 442, S. 2673, supra note 95.
98. H.R. 3763 §§ 801-807.
99. H.R. 3763 §§ 901-911.
100. Union Calendar No. 247, H.R. 3763, supra note 92.
101. President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Signing of the Corporate Accountability Bill (July 30, 2002),
in FED. NEWS SERV., July 30, 2002.

102. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101(a), 116 Stat. 745, 750 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 721 I).
103. Id. §§ 201-209.
104. Id. §§ 301-409.
105.

Id. § 101(a).
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companies.' °6 The Act requires the registration of any public accounting firm
involved in the preparation or issue of an audit report for an issuer. °7
The PCAOB is directed to set auditing, quality control, and independence
standards that will govern registered public accounting firms.108 The Act provides
that the PCAOB shall adopt accounting standards requiring each registered public
firm to prepare and maintain audit work papers for seven years, require that a
"concurring or second partner review and approv[e]" audit reports, and describe the
auditor's testing of the issuer's internal control structure in the audit report."
The PCAOB is also given authority to conduct inspections of registered
accounting firms" 0 to identify any "act, practice or omission" that may be in
violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the rules of the PCAOB, the rules of the SEC,
the firm's own quality control procedures, or professional standards."' Accounting
firms that regularly audit more than 100 issuers are to be inspected every year." 2
Firms auditing less than 100 issuers are to be inspected no less frequently than every
three years." 3
Furthermore, the PCAOB is authorized to conduct investigations and disciplinary
proceedings and impose sanctions on registered public accounting firms." 4 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizes the PCAOB to impose sanctions that include
suspension or revocation of registration, limitations on a firm's activities, civil
penalties, additional professional education or training, and any other sanction
included in the PCAOB's rules. "'
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act gives the SEC "oversight and enforcement authority
over the [PCAOB]."" 6 The PCAOB is to be funded through registration fees
collected from accounting firms and "accounting support fees" collected from
issuers.'
B. Analysis of the PCAOB
1. The Accounting Industry Is No Longer Self-Regulated
Undoubtedly the accounting industry is forever changed by the creation of the
PCAOB. Prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, accountants and
accounting firms were essentially self-regulated. The AICPA and FASB,
organizations largely made up of accountants, established the majority of the rules
governing the accounting industry. The Act fundamentally altered the regulatory

106. Id. §
107. Id. §
108. Id. §
109. Id. §
110. Id. §
111.Id. §
112. Id. §

101(c)(1).
102(a).
101(c)(2).
103(a)(2)(A).
101(c)(3).
104(c).

104(b).
113. Id.
114. Id. § 101(c)(4).

115. Id. § 105(b)(3).
116. Id. § 107(a).
117. Id. § 109.
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scheme for auditing by requiring every public accounting firm to register with the
PCAOB and comply with the PCAOB's auditing standards.
Furthermore, the creation of the PCAOB establishes the SEC's authority to
discipline the accounting profession. The SEC previously proposed to
administratively create a similar board, but questions existed regarding the SEC's
authority to do so." 8 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act clearly establishes that the SEC,
through the PCAOB, may regulate the accounting industry. Thus, with the passage
of the Act, the accounting industry becomes a federally regulated industry.
2. The Accounting Industry's Influence Continues
a. The PCAOB May Adopt Rules Established by Accounting Organizations
Despite this new regulatory scheme, accountants may continue to exert significant
influence over the regulation of the accounting industry. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
authorizes the PCAOB to adopt auditing standards proposed by professional groups
of accountants such as the AICPA or FASB." 9 Thus, although the PCAOB is
required to satisfy the specific auditing provisions set out in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
it may do so by adopting rules established by the AICPA or other professional
groups. Drafting completely new auditing rules is a difficult and daunting task, and
the PCAOB may opt to rely on the accounting industry to write these rules. In this
way, the accounting industry may retain a substantial amount of influence over its
own regulators.
b. The SEC and PCAOB Operate Under Intense Political Pressure
Similarly, the members of the PCAOB are exposed to political pressure from the
accounting industry. 2 ° Section 101(e) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act details the
membership requirements for the PCAOB. The PCAOB is to consist of five
members with "an understanding of the responsibilities for and nature of the
financial disclosures required of issuers under the securities laws and the obligations
of accountants with respect to the preparation and issuance of audit reports with
respect to such disclosures."' 2 ' However, the Act allows no more than two members
to be or have been CPAs.'22 Although this limitation on CPAs undoubtedly reduces
the PCAOB members' personal ties to the accounting industry, the accounting
industry remains a powerful lobbying force and can be expected to pressure the
PCAOB.

118. Senate, House Conferees Agree on Reform Measure, FED. SEC. L. REP. Issue No. 2038, at 2035 (July
26, 2002).
119. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103(a)(3).
120. The accounting industry has considerable political power. The industry has avoided regulation thus far
by aggressively lobbying legislators and making political contributions. The accounting industry launched a multimillion dollar lobbying campaign to prevent Congress from passing the accounting reforms in the Act. See Jackie
Spinner, Audit Firms Rev Up Lobbying Push, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2002, at El; Jim VanderHei & David S.
Hilzenrath, Hill Leaders Agree on CorporateCurbs; Attack on FraudIncludes Auditing Controland Jail Terms;
Markets Soar, WASH. POST, July 25, 2002, at Al.
121. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(e)(l).
122. Id. § 101(e)(2).
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The SEC's difficulty in appointing members to the PCAOB demonstrates how
difficult and politically complicated the PCAOB's job will be. According to the
23
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, PCAOB members serve for a term of five years.
Furthermore, members must serve on a full-time basis and may not have any other
employment or business activity during their term. 24 The exclusivity and time
requirements alone limit the number of individuals that are able, let alone willing,
to serve on the PCAOB.
From this pool of individuals the SEC must then find members that are politically
acceptable. This has proven to be difficult. 125 For example, SEC Chairman Harvey
Pitt initially attempted to appoint John Biggs to head the PCAOB. 26 Biggs had been
critical of the accounting profession and publicly supported increasing accounting
oversight. 27 However, Pitt was pressured by Republican lawmakers and the
accounting industry to28forgo this candidate, who was seen as being too tough on the
accounting industry.
The SEC then appointed William Webster to head the PCAOB, over the bitter
objections of the Democratic commissioners.129 Pitt and the other Republican
commissioners faced accusations that they "had succumbed to the pressures from
the accounting industry"'30 because Webster lacked the experience and knowledge
needed to oversee the accounting industry.' 3 ' Webster's appointment exploded in
controversy when it was revealed that Webster headed the audit committee of a
Washington company with significant accounting33 problems. 3 2 After less than a
month as head of the PCAOB, Webster resigned.
Also implicated in the controversy was Chairman Pitt. 134 He tendered his own
resignation after it was revealed that Webster had informed him of the audit
committee issues, but Pitt had failed to deliver this information to the other
commissioners. 3 On February 14, 2003, the Senate confirmed the nomination of
William H. Donaldson as the new chairman of the SEC. 36 Donaldson indicated that

123. Id. § 101(e)(5).
124. Id. § 101(e)(3).
125. Stephen Labaton, SEC Chief Hedges on Accounting Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002, at CI; Paul
Krugman, Editorial, Revenge of the Accountants, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 2002, at A38; Paul Krugman, Editorial, Fool
Me Once, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2002, at A3 1; David S.Hilzenrath, Webster to Lead Auditing Oversight; SEC Votes
3-2 over DemocraticObjections, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2002, at El; David S.Hilzenrath & Kathleen Day, Webster
Leaving Audit Job; Resignation May Hinder Cleanup, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2002, at AI.
126. Labaton, supra note 125; Krugman, Revenge of the Accountants, supra note 125; Krugman, Fool Me
Once, supra note 125.

127. Labaton, supra note 125; Krugman, Revenge of the Accountants, supra note 125; Krugman, Fool Me
Once, supra note 125.
128. Labaton, supra note 125; Krugman, Revenge of the Accountants, supra note 125; Krugman, Fool Me
Once, supra note 125.
129. Hilzenrath, supra note 125.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. While Webster was head of the audit committee, the company repeatedly failed to file financial reports
on time and fired an outside auditor after the auditor warned the company that it "lacked the accounting controls
necessary to produce reliable financial reports." Id.
133.

Id.

134. Id.
135.

Id.

136. Donaldson Confirmedfor SEC, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2003, at E2.
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his first priority would be finding a chair for the PCAOB.'37 As of this writing,
however, the board remains leaderless.
c. The SEC and PCAOB Have Insufficient Resources
Once the PCAOB is complete, it has a number of pressing tasks to complete. It
must establish the auditing rules that will govern the industry, register public
accounting firms, and then begin inspecting these firms. All this must be
accomplished using the fees collected from issuers and accounting firms.138
Although overseen by the SEC, the PCAOB will be hard pressed to obtain much
assistance from the resource-strapped SEC. Suffering from budget constraints, the
SEC has indicated it will not be able to handle the record number of enforcement
actions arising out of the corporate scandals of 2002.139 According to a GAO report,
the SEC has insufficient financial resources and "has been faced with an ever
increasing workload and ongoing human capital challenges."'" Although Congress
has drafted spending legislation that significantly increases the SEC's funding, the
SEC has not, as of this writing, received additional funding. 4 Clearly, the SEC does
not have sufficient resources to do its own job. This makes it unlikely that the SEC
will be able to help jumpstart the PCAOB.
3. Accounting Reform Depends on the Success of the PCAOB
Clearly the success of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act depends largely on the success of
the PCAOB. The PCAOB is responsible for implementing key provisions of the Act.
The PCAOB is responsible for inspecting accounting firms to ensure the Act is
being properly followed. The PCAOB is also responsible for investigating and
disciplining accounting firms that are not in compliance. With the PCAOB off to a
rocky start, it faces numerous obstacles.
C. New Rules and Proceduresfor Auditors
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also attempts to improve corporate accounting by
addressing issues regarding auditors. The Act establishes rules regarding the
independence of auditors.'42 It also dictates procedures that auditors must follow in
the performance of audits. 43

137. Kathleen Day, Senate Committee Backs SEC Nominee, DonaldsonCould Be at Work Next Week, WASH.
POST, Feb. 12, 2003, at El.
138. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 109, 116 Stat. 745, 769 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
7219).
139. SEC Seeks GreaterResourcesfor Enforcement Cases: Regulation Backed by a Study, the Agency Will
Ask Congressfor a Bigger 2003 Budget to Handle Post-EnronDemand, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, pt. 3, at 6.
140. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTINGOFFICE, SEC OPERATIONS; INCREASED WORKLOADCREATES CHALLENGES,

GAO-02-302, at 33 (Mar. 2002), availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02302.pdf.
141. Dan Morgan, GOP Wraps Up Spending Package; Despite Snags in $397.4 Billion Plan, Republicans
Signal Readiness to Vote, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2003, at Al.
142. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 201-209.
143. Id.
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1. Auditor Independence
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act addresses auditor independence in a number of ways.'"
Section 201 addresses the potential conflict of interest that arises when an
accounting firm audits a company and also performs non-audit services for the
company. Section 201 prohibits the auditing firm from performing a number of nonaudit services.' 45 The Act specifically prohibits an auditing firm from performing
bookkeeping services, financial information systems design or implementation,
appraisal or valuation services, actuarial services, internal audit outsourcing
services, management functions, investment banking services, legal services, and
any other services the PCAOB decides to prohibit."4 The Act does, however, allow
the issuer's audit committee to approve non-audit services that are not specifically
prohibited. 47
'
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also addresses several other potential conflicts of
interest between auditors and issuers. Section 203 requires the rotation of auditors
by making it
unlawful for a registered public accounting firm to provide audit services to an
issuer if the lead (or coordinating) audit partner (having primary responsibility
for the audit), or the audit partner responsible for reviewing the audit has
performed audit services for that issuer in each of the 5 previous fiscal years of
that issuer.'48
In other words, if the lead audit partner has audited a client for five consecutive
years, a new audit partner must perform the audit services on the sixth year.
Similarly, Section 206 prohibits accounting firms from auditing companies whose
officers are former employees."' Specifically, Section 206 forbids the audit of an
issuer if the
chief executive officer, controller, chief financial officer, chief accounting
officer, or any person serving in an equivalent position, was employed by that
registered independent public accounting firm and participated in any capacity
in the audit of that issuer
during the 1-year period preceding the date of the
50
initiation of the audit.
As the SEC explains, when former employees of accounting firms assume positions
with the firm's audit clients, they may be able to "influence the content of the audit
client's accounting records and financial statements on one hand, and the conduct
of the audit on the other."' 51 Section 206 addresses this potential conflict of interest.

144. Id.
145. Id. § 201(a).
146. Id.
147. Id. § 201(h).
148. Id. § 203.
149. Id. § 206.
150. Id.
151. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008, 76,041 (Dec.
5, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
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2. Audit Procedure
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also dictates the contents of an auditor's report to the
audit committee.'52 Under Section 204, the auditor must report
(1) all critical accounting policies and practices to be used; (2) all alternative
treatments of financial information within generally accepted accounting
principles that have been discussed with management officials of the issuer,
ramification of the use of such alternative disclosures and treatments, and the
treatment preferred by the registered accounting firm; and (3) other material
written communication between
the registered public accounting firm and the
3
management of the issuer.1
Furthermore, pursuant to Section 401, financial reports must disclose "all material
correcting adjustments that have been identified by a registered public accounting
firm in accordance with [GAAP] and the rules and regulations of the
Commission. '54
Finally, Section 802 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires "any accountant who
conducts an audit of an issuer" to "maintain all audit or review workpapers for a
period of 5 years from the end of the fiscal period in which the audit or review was
concluded.""' An accountant that "knowingly and willfully"
violates this provision
56
faces fines and up to ten years imprisonment, or both.
D. Analysis of New Rules and ProceduresForAuditors
1. Auditor Independence
When the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is compared to existing auditor independence
rules, it is unclear whether the Act will really improve information or protect
investors as it claims. At first blush, the prohibitions on non-audit services in
Section 201 would appear to improve auditor independence by removing the
possibility that the objectivity of an auditor will be influenced by potential fees from
non-audit services. However, Section 201 does not accomplish as much as one
might believe. The section does prohibit audit firms from performing many nonaudit services,' 57 but the nine prohibited services were already prohibited by the
SEC.' 58 Thus, the Act's provisions do not improve existing independence rules in
this regard. Furthermore, the audit committee of the issuer is authorized to allow an
accounting firm to perform any non-audit services that are not specifically
prohibited."' There remains a significant opportunity for the objectivity of auditors
to be tainted.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 204.
Id.
Id. § 401(a).
Id. § 802(a).
Id.
Id. § 201.
See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4). See supra part H.F.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201.
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Moreover, Section 201 allows an accounting firm to provide tax services for an
audit client with the approval of the audit committee."6 Historically, accounting
firms have been allowed to provide tax services to their audit clients.' 6' There has
been considerable debate over whether an auditor's independence is impaired by
performing tax services for an audit client. 62 In the final rules, issued pursuant to
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC reiterated "its long-standing position that an
accounting firm can provide tax services without impairing the firm's
independence.'63
The accounting industry strongly opposed a prohibition on tax services because
these services are a profitable business."' 4 Because they are so valuable to
accounting firms, there remains a logical and compelling argument that accounting
firms are not independent when they perform both audit and tax services. 165 In an
attempt to deal with this obvious conflict, the SEC imposed an additional
requirement that the
issuer disclose "the amount of fees paid to the accounting firm
166
for tax services."'
The partner rotation requirements of Section 203 are a valuable addition to
auditor independence rules. Section 203 makes mandatory a practice that many
accounting firms have used as part of their quality control programs. 61 7 Rotation of
partners allows an issuer's financial statements to be viewed with fresh eyes.' 68
The SEC's rules, pursuant to Section 203, go still further to improve auditor
independence. Section 203 only prohibits a partner from performing audit services
if the partner has performed the services "in each of the five previous fiscal
years."' 169 The SEC could have interpreted this to mean that after not performing the
services for one year the partner could return. The SEC chose, however, to impose
a five-year "time out" period for lead and concurring partners. 70 Thus, a partner
may only perform audit services for an issuer for five years and must then wait a full
five years before returning to that issuer.
Furthermore, the SEC extended the partner rotation requirements to "audit
partners," members of the "audit engagement team who have responsibility for
decision-making on significant auditing, accounting, and reporting matters that
affect the financial statements or who maintain regular contact with management
and the audit committee."'' This is a valuable extension of Section 203 because it

160.
161.
6017 (Feb.
162.
163.

Id.
Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006,
5, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240, 249, 274).
Id. at 6016.
Id. at 6017.

164. Editorial, Downsized Corporate Reform, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 2003, at A24.
165. Jonathon D. Glater, Enron 's Many Strands: Consulting; Keen Rivalry by Consultants Expected after
Auditor's Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at C l ("[Cloncems about conflicts of interest for accountants are likely
to persist because there are some kinds of services that they will continue to sell, like tax advice. That means there
is still the possibility that an auditor's judgment will be swayed by the prospect of nonaudit-related fees.").

166. Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6017.
167.

Id.

168. Id.
169.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 203, 116 Stat. 745, 773 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §

78j-1).
170. Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6018.
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requires accounting firms to rotate all the auditors that are closely involved, not just
those that hold lead or controlling partner positions.
2. Audit Procedures
Section 206 prohibits an accounting firm from auditing an issuer with a Chief
Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), controller, or accounting
officer who is a former employee of the accounting firm and participated in the
issuer's audit during the previous year,"' which undoubtedly improves existing
auditor independence rules.173 Unlike the 2000 auditor independence rule, Section
206 "requires a 'cooling off period of one year before a member of the audit
engagement team can begin working for the registrant in certain key provisions.""'
The SEC had previously considered a "cooling off' period but determined it to
"unnecessarily restrict the employment opportunities of former professionals."' 7 5
Section 206 is an important provision, reflecting "the view that the passage of time
is an additional safeguard to reduce the perceived loss of independence for the audit
firm caused by the acceptance of employment by a member of the engagement team
with an audit client. 176
Unfortunately, Section 206 and the SEC rules create as much ambiguity as they
resolve. The rules expand the scope of Section 206 beyond the four named positions
to individuals in a "financial reporting oversight role,"' 77 a phrase whose
interpretation is not immediately clear. The rules also provide a number of
exceptions for "unique situations,"'7 another unclear phrase. Furthermore, the idea
that an auditor becomes independent after a year and a day is a fiction. In all
likelihood, the one-year cooling off period really improves only the appearance of
independence.
The requirements of Section 204 create a mechanism by which auditors are
required to discuss with the audit committee the accounting practices being
employed and alternative practices that could be employed.'7 9 This is a valuable
mechanism because auditors must consider the accounting practices being used and
determine if, in their opinion, another practice is preferable. The auditor must then
communicate this information to the audit committee. This requirement should force
the auditor to decide what is the best accounting practice, rather than simply
deciding whether a practice is acceptable.
Section 204 is also valuable because it improves the quality of information
available to the audit committee. As Warren Buffett explained, it is the audit
172. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 206.
173. See Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. at
6007. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(2) (2000) with Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding
Auditor Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6044.
174. Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6007.
175. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008, 76,041 (Dec.
5, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
176. Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6007.
177. Id. at 6008.
178. Id. (The rules contain exceptions for conflicts resulting from mergers and acquisitions, conflicts in
certain foreign jurisdictions, and conflicts from emergency or unusual circumstances.).
179. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 204, 116 Stat. 745, 773 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78j-1).
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committee's job "to hold the auditor's feet to the fire."' 0 The audit committee
should consider whether the financial statements should have been prepared
differently than the manner selected by management. 81 ' The requirements of Section
204 require auditors to provide the audit committee with the information needed to
properly consider accounting issues.
Section 802 is one of the few provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that clearly
dictates an accountant's behavior and imposes a real penalty for noncompliance.8 2
The possibility of a significant fine and up to ten years in jail'83 should certainly
motivate auditors to carefully maintain their audit and review papers. This provision
seems likely to significantly reduce the willingness of accountants to destroy, alter,
or fail to appropriately create documents.
E. New Rules and Proceduresfor Issuers
In addition to new rules and procedures for auditors, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also
contains a number of accounting and auditing provisions that apply to issuers. The
Act addresses many accounting and auditing issues by prescribing the issuer's
actions. The Act attempts to protect the integrity of financial statements by
protecting the auditor from the influence of management, requiring management to
take personal responsibility for financial reports, and requiring new accounting
disclosures.
1. Separation Between Management and Auditors
Section 301 requires the audit committee of each issuer to be comprised of
independent members of the board of directors. 184 A member is not considered
independent if (1) the member accepts any consulting, advisory, or other
compensation from the issuer, other than that received in his or her capacity as a
member of the committee, the board of directors, or any other committee; or (2) is
an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof. 85 This independent audit
committee is to be "directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and
oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm employed by that
issuer" performing the company's audit.'86 Section 202 requires the audit committee
to pre-approve all auditing and non-auditing accounting services.8 7 Similarly,
Section 301 requires the accounting firms performing the audit to "report directly
to the audit committee"'' 88 rather than to management or the board of directors in
general.

180. Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6027.
181.

Id.

182. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 802.
183. Id.
184. Id. § 301 (The definitions indicate that if the company does not have an audit committee the requirements
apply to the entire board of directors.). Id. § 2(a)(3)(B).
185. Id. § 301.
186. Id.
187. Id. § 202.
188. Id. § 301.
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Along similar lines, Section 303 makes it unlawful for officers or directors of an
issuer to improperly influence the conduct of audits.'89 Officers and directors may
not "take any action to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead any
independent public or certified accountant engaged in the performance of an audit
of the financial statements of that issuer for the purpose of rendering such financial
statements materially misleading."' 90
2. Management's Responsibility for Accounting
Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires CEOs and CFOs to personally
certify the financial statements that are filed by the issuer.' These officers must
certify that (1) the officer has reviewed the financial report; (2) to the officer's
knowledge the report does not contain or omit any material fact that renders the
report misleading; (3) the financial report "fairly present[s] in all material respects
the financial condition and results of operations";' 92 (4) the signing officers are
responsible for internal controls, have designed and evaluated such controls to
ensure that the material information is made known to the signing officers, and have
included in the report their conclusions regarding the effectiveness of their internal
controls; (5) the signing officers have disclosed to the auditor any significant
deficiencies in the internal controls and any fraud involving management or other
employees who have a significant role in internal controls; and (6) the signing
officers have indicated any changes that could "significantly affect internal controls
subsequent to their evaluation."' 93 On June 27, 2002, the SEC ordered the CEOs and
CFOs .of companies reporting more than $1.2 billion in revenue to certify their
financial reports by August 14, 2002.114
In a further attempt to hold chief officers accountable for financial reports,
Section 304 provides for CEOs and CFOs to forfeit certain bonuses and profits in
the event an issuer is required to prepare accounting restatements due to "material
noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct."'' 9 5 These officers must
forfeit "any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation" 196 or
"any profits realized from the sale of securities"' 9 7 during the twelve-month period
prior to filing the noncompliant financial report.
3. Additional Financial Disclosures
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires a number of new financial disclosures. Section
401 requires the disclosure of "all material correcting adjustments that have been

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
(Aug. 28,
195.
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Id. § 303.
Id.
Id. § 302.
Id.
id. § 302.
SEC Staff Completes Processingof CEO, CFO Certification,FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 2U40, at 2043
2002).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304(a).
Id. § 304(a)(1).
Id. § 304(a)(2).
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identified by a registered public accounting firm."' 98 Section 401 also requires the
issuer to disclose
all material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations (including
contingent obligations), and other relationships of the issuer with unconsolidated
entities or other persons, that may have a material current or future effect on
financial condition, changes in financial condition, results of operations,
liquidity, capital expenditures, capital resources, or significant components of
revenue or expenses. 199
Section 401 further requires pro forma financial information to be presented in a
manner that is not misleading and adheres to GAAP. 2°
Section 403 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires directors, officers, and those
owning more than ten percent of a company's equity security to file a statement with
the SEC disclosing ownership of the securities."0 ' Section 404 requires annual
reports filed with the SEC to state that management is responsible for establishing
and maintaining an "adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial
reporting" along with an assessment of those structures and procedures.2" 2 Section
406 requires each issuer to disclose whether the company has adopted a code of
ethics for senior financial officers or, if not, to explain why no code has been
adopted. 3 Section 407 requires each issuer to disclose whether or not its audit
committee contains at least one member who is a financial expert.2 " Likewise, if the
audit committee does not include a financial expert, the issuer must disclose why.20 '
The Act also requires issuers to disclose the approval by the audit committee of a
non-audit service that is to be performed by the auditing accounting firm.2 06

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. § 401.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 403.
Id. § 404.
Id. § 406.
Id. § 407.
[A]n audit committee financial expert means a person who has the following attributes: (i) An
understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial statements; (ii) The
ability to assess the general application of such principles in connection with the accounting for
estimates, accruals and reserves; (iii) Experience preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating
financial statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of accounting issues that are
generally comparable to the breadth and complexity of issues that can reasonably be expected
to be raised by the registrant's financial statements, or experience actively supervising one or
more persons engaged in such activities; (iv) An understanding of internal controls and
procedures for financial reporting; and (v) An understanding of audit committee functions.
Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5127 (Jan.
31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 249).
205. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407.
206. Id. § 202.
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F. Analysis of New Rules and Proceduresfor Issuers
1. Analysis of Separation Between Management and Auditors
The requirement that each issuer have an independent audit committee is a
valuable step toward removing potential conflicts of interest between the auditor and
the company being audited. Historically, it has been management that contracted
with accounting firms to perform audits and other accounting services.2" 7 This
brought into question the objectivity of the auditors, who could find it difficult to
contradict the accounting practices of the management officials responsible for
employing them. Section 301, in conjunction with Section 202, helps create a
from management where the accountants may discuss their
"forum apart
20 8
concerns."
However, the effectiveness of these new rules critically depends on the audit
committee's understanding of accounting issues. Regrettably, the Sarbanes-Oxley°
Act does not require that any members of the audit committee be financial experts.
Thus, there is a possibility that the audit committee will lack the financial
sophistication to properly consider questionable accounting practices and to confront
management regarding these practices.
The usefulness of these provisions also depends on the audit committee's
independence from both the accounting firm and management. These provisions do
not address the conflicts of interest that arise because of political and social
dependence among accounting firms and boards of directors. Despite this failing,
the audit committee independence requirement gives the SEC some concrete criteria
for evaluating the independence of directors and auditors.
Section 303, likewise, provides the SEC with a rule that can be used to punish
officers or directors that inappropriately pressure auditors. 2'0 Although similar to
existing rules,2 1' this is an added protection for the auditing process. The value of
this provision, however, depends on the SEC's willingness and ability to enforce it.
2. Analysis of Management's Personal Responsibility for Financial
Statements
The provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that bind senior officers to the
accuracy of the issuer's financial statements correctly identify management as a
significant source of accounting problems. On June 27, 2002, the SEC ordered the
CEOs and CFOs of companies reporting more than $1.2 billion in revenue to certify

207. Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006,
6022 (Feb. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240, 249, 274).
208. Id.
209. Section 407 requires issuers to disclose whether or not the audit committee contains at least one financial
expert with an understanding of GAAP and experience in auditing. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407.
210. See id. § 303.
211. 17 C.F.R. 240.13b2-1 indicates that "[n]o person shall, directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be
falsified" accounting records. 17 C.F.R. 240.13b2-2 indicates that directors and officers shall not "[miake or cause
to be made any materially false or misleading statements to an accountant" or "[o]mit to state, or cause another
person to omit to state, any material fact necessary in order to make statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which statements were made, not misleading to an accountant...."
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their financial reports by August 14, 2002.2" Section 302 extends the SEC's rule to
all public companies.2 13
According to the SEC, "the overwhelming majority of CEOs and CFOs
filed
statements certifying the material accuracy and completeness of their companies'
prior disclosure reports. '214 The SEC struggled to wade through the initial
947
certifications and to determine what would happen to companies that
did
not
comply." 5 The certifications required by Section 302 are expected to number
about
14,000.16 Undoubtedly, the sheer volume of the certifications calls into
question the
ability of the SEC to deal adequately with the certification process.
The provisions of Section 304 offer a more proactive approach to accounting
accuracy. Incentive-based compensation and stock options are a popular
form of
executive compensation because they are believed to align management's
interests
with those of shareholders. 7 However, these forms of compensation also
increase
management's incentive to use creative accounting to meet earnings expectations.218
Section 304 curbs some of that incentive by requiring CEOs and CFOs to
forfeit
bonuses and profits if the company is required to restate financial information." 9
Once again, however, the value of this provision will depend on the ability
of the
SEC to identify noncompliant reports and require restatements.
3. Implications of Additional Financial Disclosures
The financial disclosures required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will provide
additional information to the investing public. The disclosures in Section 401
are the
most beneficial. Requiring issuers to disclose corrections to financial statements
made during the audit signals to investors that the auditor found a problem
in the
accounting and it was corrected. This both motivates the issuer to be careful
that the
accounting is done satisfactorily in the first place and provides investors
with
information that may help them consider the company's financial statements
more
carefully.
The requirement that off-balance sheet transactions be disclosed likewise
provides valuable information for investors. Off-balance sheet transactions
have
been used to keep corporate debt off the balance sheet, misrepresenting
a
corporation's true liability and risk.220 This requirement forces issuers
to more
accurately represent their liabilities to investors.
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The other disclosures required by the Act are less valuable, in that they do not
provide accounting information. They may, however, be useful for motivating
issuers to adopt codes of ethics and place financial experts on the audit committee
rather than explain why they have not done so.
V. CONCLUSION: THE VALUE OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
DEPENDS ON THE ABILITY OF THE SEC AND PCAOB TO ENFORCE IT
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act approaches accounting reform holistically,2 ' requiring
the federal government, accountants, and issuers to take steps to improve the
accuracy of financial statements. The creation of the PCAOB has the potential to
improve corporate accounting and auditing. The PCAOB is authorized to use
powerful tools, but investors will not benefit unless the board is willing and able to
aggressively use those tools.
Unfortunately, the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that address accounting
firms and auditors do not offer the same potential for accounting reform. Many of
the auditor independence rules are little more than a codification of previous SEC
rules. Furthermore, the Act fails to prohibit auditing firms from performing tax
services for audit clients. Thus, issuers continue to hold a powerful bargaining chip
that may impair the accounting firm's objectivity.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act makes a timely attempt to address corporate governance
issues that impair the accuracy of financial information. The use of independent
audit committees creates a needed firewall between management and auditors.
Holding management accountable for financial information forces officers to take
responsibility for the accuracy of financial statements. These provisions, combined
with the increased disclosures, offer some helpful assurances that management is not
simply creating the accounting figures they want the public to see.
On the whole, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains a number of provisions that have
the potential to improve corporate accounting practices. However, the legislation
leaves to the SEC and the PCAOB the responsibility to implement and enforce the
legislation. Due to political forces and serious resource constraints, it is unclear if
these agencies will be able to implement the Act. Whether these agencies will be
able to effectively implement the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to improve corporate
accounting and protect investors remains to be seen.
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